Making Retail Banks Resolvable

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1. Research question

- **Scope:** (i) Retail banks – deposits/liabilities < 40%; (ii) both significant & less significant; (iii) that meet the public interest test.
- **Trade-off:** resolvability v viability
- **EU Problem:** diverse banking sector
  - **Significant banks:** 70% not listed, 60% never issued convertible bonds (CoCos), and 25% never issued subordinated debt [Restoy, 2018].
  - **Less significant banks:** Approximately 70 banks are domestically significant.

- **How do we deal with this grey zone?**
2. Strategies: overview

- Single Resolution Board
- Liquidation
- Administrative
- Open-bank bail-in
- Transfer
- Financing
  - State Aid + Burden Sharing
  - Bail-in + Resolution funds
  - Bail-in + Resolution funds
2. Strategies: (i) open-bank bail-in

- Financing: **min. 8%** bail-in + **max. 5%** SRF.
- Max. 5% SRF:
  - Resolution financing is limited → pressure for more bail-in.
- Min. 8% bail-in:
  - Requires liability buffers (MREL) for loss-absorption and recapitalization.
  - BUT losses > minimum capital = need for higher MREL and bail-in?
  - high cost of MREL liabilities.
- What value and what business model left?
2. Strategies: (ii) transfer strategies

- **Use of transfer tools**: sale of business, asset separation, bridge institution.
- In principle, lower MREL requirements.
- 2 scenarios:
  - a buyer already exists → perfect
  - a buyer does not exist → bridge institution.
- Financing: **min. 8%** bail-in + **max. 5%** SRF.
2. Strategies: (iii) administrative liquidation

- Use of transfer tools + state aid + burden sharing.
- Comparison with resolution transfer strategy:
  - Toolkit: same;
  - Amount of bail-in/burden-sharing: lower requirements;
  - Financing: limited private/more flexible public;
  - Competent authority: European/national.
- Risk of de facto circumvention of resolution (Veneto banks).
2. Strategies: conclusions

- Single Resolution Board
  - Resolution
    - Liquidation
    - Administrative
      - Open-bank bail-in
      - Transfer
    - Financing
      - State Aid + Burden Sharing
      - Bail-in + Resolution funds
      - Bail-in + Resolution funds

Financing:
- Works, but risk of circumventing resolution
- Too much MREL & bail-in
- Less but still much MREL & bail-in
3. Recommendations

• Enhancing resolution transfer strategies for retail banks since:
  • losses/ resolution costs still need to be covered, but no need for full recapitalization; thus, lower MREL levels;
  • there will always be bigger banks willing to buy;
  • however, when bail-in might go beyond junior creditors, need for collective funds:
    • Allow SRF use for higher than 5%;
    • Establish voluntary collective industry funds.
3. Recommendations

- ‘Base’ legal vehicle for such funds: institutional protection schemes (IPSs).
  - Successful in countries used, i.e. Germany;
  - Flexible trigger;
  - Incentive to join – lower MREL levels;
  - The SRB could incorporate such arrangements in its MREL policy – aligned with BRRD 2 on cooperative networks;
- Moral hazard risks – contributions based on risk-weights/leverage ratios;
- Liquidity risks.
- Could establish resolution-specific financing arrangements.
4. Conclusion

• From existing strategies, resolution transfer strategies may be the most suitable for many retail banks.
• Need for credible collective financing:
  • Higher limit to the use of SRF funds ($5\%<)$;
  • Establishment of voluntary industry funds in exchange for lower MREL levels.